gcp-gke-rbac-exec-pod
K8s RBAC pods/exec create (or ClusterRole containing it) on a namespace/cluster grants CanExecuteCommand on pods in scope - the direct exec path independent of GCP IAM.
match (effective permission)
{
"action": "k8s:pods/exec create",
"resource_type": "k8s/Pod"
}
where
?principal holds pods/exec create (as a ClusterRole verb) via a ClusterRoleBinding or a RoleBinding in the pod's namespace
?pod is within the scope of the RBAC grant (namespace or cluster-wide)
emit
| source type | Identity |
|---|---|
| target type | KubernetesWorkload |
| source | <principal> |
| target | <pod / KubernetesWorkload in scope> |
| permissions | k8s:pods/exec create |
| conditions | iam_permission service_state |
| state logic | ACTIVE if the ClusterRoleBinding or RoleBinding granting pods/exec create is confirmed and the pod is running. CONDITIONAL(service_state) if the pod is not currently running (exec requires a live container). BLOCKED if a PodSecurity admission controller, OPA/Gatekeeper, or Kyverno policy denies exec; emit BLOCKED with denied_by=<admission controller>. |
Narrative
{principal.name} holds pods/exec create (via ClusterRoleBinding / RoleBinding) on {pod.name}, allowing it to run arbitrary shell commands inside the running pod - equivalent to interactive access to the container filesystem and any mounted credentials.
Raw rule rules/derived/gcp/gke.yaml
id: gcp-gke-rbac-exec-pod
emits: CanExecuteCommand
description: "K8s RBAC pods/exec create (or ClusterRole containing it) on a namespace/cluster grants CanExecuteCommand\
\ on pods in scope \u2014 the direct exec path independent of GCP IAM."
match_effective_permission:
action: k8s:pods/exec create
resource_type: k8s/Pod
where:
- ?principal holds pods/exec create (as a ClusterRole verb) via a ClusterRoleBinding or a RoleBinding
in the pod's namespace
- ?pod is within the scope of the RBAC grant (namespace or cluster-wide)
emit:
source_type: Identity
target_type: KubernetesWorkload
source: <principal>
target: <pod / KubernetesWorkload in scope>
permissions:
- k8s:pods/exec create
conditions:
- iam_permission
- service_state
state_logic: ACTIVE if the ClusterRoleBinding or RoleBinding granting pods/exec create is confirmed
and the pod is running. CONDITIONAL(service_state) if the pod is not currently running (exec requires
a live container). BLOCKED if a PodSecurity admission controller, OPA/Gatekeeper, or Kyverno policy
denies exec; emit BLOCKED with denied_by=<admission controller>.
confidence: 0.95
derived_from:
- <RBAC ClusterRoleBinding / RoleBinding granting pods/exec create on ?pod>
false_positive_note: "Scope the exec verb PRECISELY to the namespace and pod. A RoleBinding in namespace\
\ A does not grant exec in namespace B. A ClusterRoleBinding with resourceNames restricts to specific\
\ pods \u2014 honor it. Exec requires the pod to be Running; a Pending/Completed/CrashLoopBackOff\
\ pod is CONDITIONAL(service_state). PodSecurity / admission webhooks may deny exec even if RBAC allows\
\ it \u2014 emit BLOCKED when such a policy is detected."
narrative: "{principal.name} holds pods/exec create (via ClusterRoleBinding / RoleBinding) on {pod.name},\
\ allowing it to run arbitrary shell commands inside the running pod \u2014 equivalent to interactive\
\ access to the container filesystem and any mounted credentials."