aws-ecr-put-replication-can-modify-configuration

A principal with ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration can change the registry's replication destination settings, enabling supply-chain image interception and poisoning across all repositories in the account.

derived aws emits CanModifyConfiguration

match

A conjunctive graph pattern. Variables (?x) bind node ids; every clause must hold.

where

emit

source type	`Identity`
target type	`Account`
source	`?principal`
target	`?account`
permissions	`ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration`
conditions	`iam_permission`
state logic	ACTIVE when the principal has effective ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration at the registry/account level (not denied by SCP or permission boundary). This edge expresses the capability to change registry-wide replication settings affecting all repositories in the account. An SCP requiring replication to go only to blessed destinations would BLOCK this edge.

source type

Identity

target type

Account

source

?principal

target

?account

permissions

ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration

conditions

iam_permission

state logic

ACTIVE when the principal has effective ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration at the registry/account level (not denied by SCP or permission boundary). This edge expresses the capability to change registry-wide replication settings affecting all repositories in the account. An SCP requiring replication to go only to blessed destinations would BLOCK this edge.

Narrative

{principal.name} can reconfigure the replication settings of the ECR registry in account {account.id} (ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration), potentially routing replicated images to attacker-controlled destination repositories and enabling a supply-chain interception attack that affects all repositories in the account.

Raw rule rules/derived/aws/ecr.yaml

id: aws-ecr-put-replication-can-modify-configuration
emits: CanModifyConfiguration
description: A principal with ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration can change the registry's replication destination
  settings, enabling supply-chain image interception and poisoning across all repositories in the account.
match:
- - principal: null
  - HasPermission
  - account: null
where:
- node_type(?account) == Account
- effective_permission(?principal, 'ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration', '<account-registry-arn>') == true
emit:
  source_type: Identity
  target_type: Account
  source: ?principal
  target: ?account
  permissions:
  - ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration
  conditions:
  - iam_permission
  state_logic: ACTIVE when the principal has effective ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration at the registry/account
    level (not denied by SCP or permission boundary). This edge expresses the capability to change registry-wide
    replication settings affecting all repositories in the account. An SCP requiring replication to go
    only to blessed destinations would BLOCK this edge.
  confidence: 0.85
  derived_from:
  - effective_permission(?principal, ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration, <account-registry-arn>)
  false_positive_note: PutReplicationConfiguration is a registry/account-level operation, not per-repository.
    The escalation consequence requires the attacker to also control (or have CanModifyCode on) the destination
    repositories configured by the new replication rule. If the destinations are in separate accounts
    or untrusted, the supply-chain impact is realized only if the principal can push to those destinations
    OR if they are already compromised.
  narrative: '{principal.name} can reconfigure the replication settings of the ECR registry in account
    {account.id} (ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration), potentially routing replicated images to attacker-controlled
    destination repositories and enabling a supply-chain interception attack that affects all repositories
    in the account.'