CanModifyConfiguration
Source can change config (env vars, layers, startup command, identity binding) to gain execution or escalate. Produced by explicit normalization (control-plane config-update permissions) and by derived rules (trigger hijacking, notification redirection).
Identity
── CanModifyConfiguration ──▸
Compute, Messaging, Network, *
Source types
IdentityTarget types
ComputeMessagingNetwork*States
ACTIVE
CONDITIONAL
POTENTIAL
BLOCKED
UNKNOWN
Derivation
| nature | both |
|---|
Per-cloud
| cloud | permissions / triggers | note |
|---|---|---|
| aws |
lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition
|
|
| gcp |
cloudfunctions.functions.update compute.instances.setMetadata
|
|
| azure |
site config write VM extension write
|
Rules that emit CanModifyConfiguration 286
amplify:UpdateApp can change iamServiceRoleArn, env vars, and auto-build config.
awsderived
amplify:UpdateBranch can change env vars, enableAutoBuild, computeRoleArn, and backend env.
awsderived
amplify:UpdateApp vpcConfig change enables build access to private VPC resources.
awsderived
A principal with App Mesh route/service write actions can modify the Envoy xDS configuration delivered to mesh sidecars, redirecting in-mesh or inbound gateway traffic to an attacker-controlled virtual node (traffic hijack within the mesh).
awsderived
UpdateService can change instance role, start command, env vars, secrets, and egress.
awsderived
athena:UpdateWorkGroup lets a principal rewrite the workgroup output S3 location, redirecting subsequent users' query results to an attacker-controlled bucket.
awsderived
Alter launch template/config UserData or ImageId so newly launched instances execute attacker-controlled boot code.
awsderived
backup:PutBackupVaultLockConfiguration allows locking a backup vault in compliance mode, preventing deletion of recovery points and vault access policy changes for a configured retention period - a persistence/ransomware primitive.
awsderived
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Change environment option settings (identity binding, env vars, platform hooks).
awsderived
cloudformation:UpdateStack changing only the stack's service role (--role-arn) to a more-privileged role: swaps the execution identity without modifying the template.
awsderived
A principal with cloudfront:UpdateDistribution can change origins, behaviors, WAF association, Lambda@Edge bindings, HTTPS policy, OAC/OAI, and trusted signers - altering the effective network posture and access controls of the distribution.
awsderived
cloudwatch:DisableAlarmActions silences alarm response automation (SNS/Lambda/SSM actions) without deleting the alarm - a stealthy detection-evasion primitive.
awsderived
cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm creates or overwrites an alarm definition, enabling alarm suppression via threshold manipulation, action redirection, or metric/expression rewriting - a high-impact evasion primitive.
awsderived
logs:DeleteMetricFilter or logs:PutMetricFilter on a log group removes or corrupts the metric filter expression that feeds CloudWatch alarms, creating a detection blind spot.
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logs:DeleteSubscriptionFilter or logs:PutSubscriptionFilter on a log group cuts or redirects real-time log delivery to a SIEM, security data lake, or Lambda-based alert processor.
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Adding an external connection to a CodeArtifact repository can enable dependency confusion by allowing public-registry packages to be resolved by downstream consumers.
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UpdateRepository can add a malicious upstream repository to a victim repository's upstream chain, enabling packages from the attacker's repository to be resolved by the victim's consumers.
awsderived
codebuild:UpdateProject modifies env vars, image, VPC, privileged mode, and service role (config side).
awsderived
codebuild:UpdateWebhook allows a principal to modify an existing webhook's filter groups or event types, potentially broadening the trigger surface.
awsderived
Deregistering an OU from Control Tower governance (or reparenting accounts) removes the inherited SCP guardrails from those accounts.
awsderived
datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition rewrites the pipeline's role, resourceRole, schedule, and cluster configuration - changing execution identity or trigger requires iam:PassRole for the new role.
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datapipeline:AddTags allows altering pipeline tags used in IAM conditions, potentially defeating tag-based access restrictions.
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Deleting the Detective behavior graph is a defense-evasion / cover-tracks primitive that reduces investigative coverage (ADMINISTRATOR ONLY). Emits CanModifyConfiguration on the SecurityService node.
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Forcibly removing a member account from a Detective behavior graph (detective:DeleteMembers) is a defense-evasion primitive (ADMINISTRATOR ONLY). Emits CanModifyConfiguration on the SecurityService node.
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A member account can remove itself from a Detective behavior graph (detective:DisassociateMembership). This is a self-removal action with reduced scope. Emits CONDITIONAL CanModifyConfiguration.
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Modifying organization-wide Detective configuration (UpdateOrganizationConfiguration, EnableOrganizationAdminAccount) weakens the org's investigative posture. Emits CanModifyConfiguration on the Organization scope.
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IAM principal with Direct Connect write actions can create or modify virtual interfaces and DXGW associations, altering which networks have a routed path into AWS VPCs (network topology manipulation). Covers constructive/expansive actions only (Create, Update, Accept); Delete actions are modeled separately as CanDelete.
awsderived
Detaching a volume from a victim instance, attaching it to an attacker-controlled instance, modifying the filesystem (cron, SSH keys, startup scripts), and re-attaching enables both data write and indirect CanModifyConfiguration on the victim instance. This is the inverse of aws-ebs-volume-mount-read.
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A principal with ecr:PutImageTagMutability can change an IMMUTABLE repository to MUTABLE, unblocking push overwrites on protected tags (prerequisite removal for CanModifyCode).
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A principal with ecr:PutReplicationConfiguration can change the registry's replication destination settings, enabling supply-chain image interception and poisoning across all repositories in the account.
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RegisterTaskDefinition lets attacker author image/command/env and choose the task role.
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CreateAccessEntry + AssociateAccessPolicy with AmazonEKSClusterAdminPolicy also grants the principal ability to modify cluster access configuration, enabling chaining to downstream cluster-auth-mode control paths.
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eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociation lets an IAM principal link any namespace:SA to any IAM role it can pass (iam:PassRole). An attacker with this permission can reroute an existing SA to a more-privileged role, or add a new association for a SA they can run pods as, gaining that role's credentials at the next pod startup.
awsderived
eks:UpdateClusterConfig allows changing the cluster's authenticationMode, endpoint access settings (public/private), and upgrade policy. An attacker with this permission can enable API authenticationMode to allow access entry creation, or change endpoint access to make the API server reachable, enabling follow-on access entry cluster-admin escalation.
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eks:UpdateNodegroupConfig allows modifying an existing node group's launch template and scaling configuration. An attacker with this permission can supply a custom launch template with an attacker-controlled AMI or user-data, gaining CanModifyCode on nodes that cycle through the new template.
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elasticache:ModifyReplicationGroup with AuthToken + AuthTokenUpdateStrategy=SET (or AuthTokenEnabled=false) sets or removes the Redis AUTH token to an attacker-controlled value. elasticache:ModifyUser resets ACL user passwords. elasticache:ModifyServerlessCache modifies UserGroup bindings. The principal gains the capability to mutate cache auth configuration; paired with network reachability, this yields data-plane access.
awsderived
elasticache:ModifyUserGroup can add an attacker-controlled ACL User to a User Group that is already attached to a Redis/Valkey cluster. The attacker then authenticates as that user to the cluster with the user's effective ACL permissions (which may include allcommands/allkeys for full access). This bypasses the AUTH token and grants data-plane access via the ACL user.
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Replace the security groups on an ALB or CLB with a permissive one to open inbound access from any source to the load balancer (network gate weakening).
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Modify an ALB listener whose default action includes authenticate-oidc or authenticate-cognito to remove or replace the authentication action, bypassing application-layer identity enforcement before traffic reaches the backend.
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Modify an ALB listener rule whose actions include authenticate-oidc or authenticate-cognito to bypass per-path authentication enforced by that rule.
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scheduler:UpdateSchedule lets a principal change an existing schedule's target ARN, execution role, or schedule expression - re-routing or re-timing execution.
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pipes:UpdatePipe lets a principal change an existing Pipe's target, enrichment, source filter, or execution role - re-routing or re-escalating persistent data flow.
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A principal with fms:PutPolicy can overwrite an existing Firewall Manager policy with an empty or permissive rule set, or set RemediationEnabled=false, disabling org-wide enforcement of WAF/Shield/Security Group/Network Firewall/ DNS Firewall controls across all in-scope member accounts - a high-blast-radius defense-evasion / cover-tracks primitive. The policy object persists; enforcement is weakened but not destroyed.
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A principal with fms:PutNotificationChannel can replace the SNS topic that receives FMS compliance notifications, redirecting or suppressing alerts about policy violations. This silences detective coverage without removing enforcement.
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A principal with globalaccelerator:UpdateEndpointGroup or globalaccelerator:AddEndpoints can redirect internet-bound anycast traffic to a different or attacker-influenced endpoint within the account (traffic hijack / defense evasion).
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Disable the GuardDuty detector via UpdateDetector(Enable=false), pausing all finding generation.
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Create or update a GuardDuty filter to auto-archive (suppress) specific findings, enabling stealthy evasion while the detector appears operational.
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Add attacker-controlled IPs to a GuardDuty trusted-IP set (IPSet), suppressing network-based findings for those addresses.
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Sever a member account's GuardDuty aggregation link to the Organizations delegated administrator, creating a central-monitoring blind spot.
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Redirect GuardDuty findings export to an attacker-controlled S3 bucket, exfiltrating security telemetry and severing central SOC visibility.
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Mark GuardDuty findings as FALSE_POSITIVE to bypass SOAR automation, poison the ML model, and reduce SOC visibility.
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Principal with inspector2:Disable can stop vulnerability scanning in the account (or designated member accounts from delegated-admin), removing continuous CVE and network-exposure detection - a defense-evasion primitive.
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Principal with inspector2:UpdateConfiguration can modify scan settings (e.g., Lambda deep scan, ECR scanning toggle), affecting detection depth but not service enablement.
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Delegated-administrator account principal with inspector2:Disable can disable scanning for any/all organization member accounts simultaneously, stopping CVE detection across the entire AWS Organization from a single API call.
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lakeformation:UpdateResource + iam:PassRole to lakeformation.amazonaws.com lets a principal swap the IAM role Lake Formation uses to vend temporary S3 credentials for a registered location, redirecting all subsequent data access through a role of the attacker's choosing.
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Granting resource access to a bucket makes its objects readable by an instance/account principal.
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Pausing Macie (macie2:UpdateMacieSession with status=PAUSED) temporarily stops sensitive-data classification and finding generation from the account without deleting configurations or findings - a weaken-defenses / cover-tracks primitive.
awsderived
kafkaconnect:UpdateConnector modifies connector task count, settings (topic routing, downstream endpoint, embedded credentials), and capacity - configuration changes with security-relevant side effects.
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kafka:UpdateClusterConfiguration applies a new Kafka broker configuration version to the MSK cluster, affecting settings such as auto.create.topics.enable, log retention, and replication factors.
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kafka:UpdateSecurity modifies cluster authentication and encryption settings, including potentially enabling unauthenticated client access, which removes the IAM and Kafka ACL authorization gates.
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Modify the firewall policy directly (change default action to PASS, remove blocking rule groups), weakening or eliminating VPC traffic filtering (defense evasion).
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Swap the policy associated with a firewall to a permissive alternative, weakening or eliminating VPC traffic filtering (defense evasion).
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Modify or delete a customer-managed Network Firewall rule group to remove or corrupt 5-tuple/Suricata DROP/REJECT rules, opening traffic paths across all firewall policies that reference the group (defense evasion; blast radius scales with rule group reuse and RAM sharing).
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Disable or modify the firewall's logging configuration, removing evidence of network traffic inspection, rule violations, and IPS alerts (cover tracks).
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route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets on a public hosted zone enables DNS record mutation - traffic redirection, MX/SPF override, and subdomain NS delegation (DNS hijacking primitive).
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route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets on a private hosted zone enables internal DNS hijacking within associated VPCs - traffic redirection for VPC-resident workloads only.
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route53:CreateHostedZone with --vpc or route53:AssociateVPCWithHostedZone enables creating a shadow private zone or extending an existing zone's resolution scope across VPCs - DNS MITM for all workloads in the associated VPC.
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route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets enables adding NS records for a subdomain, delegating full authority for that subtree to an attacker-controlled nameserver (broader than a single A-record redirect).
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route53domains:UpdateDomainNameservers replaces the authoritative NS servers at the domain registry - full domain takeover, redirecting ALL DNS resolution for the domain to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
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route53domains:TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount transfers domain registration ownership to another AWS account - complete loss of domain registration control, enabling the attacker to modify registrar settings and potentially lock out the legitimate owner.
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s3:PutBucketNotification lets a principal reconfigure event notification targets (Lambda/SQS/SNS/EventBridge) for a bucket, redirecting all S3 events to attacker-controlled destinations.
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UpdateNotebookInstance changes notebook configuration including RoleArn (with PassRole), instance type, subnet, and security groups.
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UpdateDomain changes the default execution role for all new Studio apps in the domain.
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UpdateUserProfile changes the execution role for a specific Studio user profile.
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UpdatePipeline can also change the pipeline's RoleArn (with PassRole), swapping the execution identity for all future pipeline executions.
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Principal can suppress Security Hub findings (securityhub:BatchUpdateFindings), setting workflow state to SUPPRESSED or RESOLVED to hide attacker activity from dashboards and automated response - a defense-evasion primitive that does not grant access to any resource.
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Principal can disable Security Hub security controls, compliance standards, or the entire service (securityhub:UpdateStandardsControl / securityhub:BatchDisableStandards / securityhub:DisableSecurityHub), permanently preventing Security Hub from generating findings for those checks or disabling all detection - a persistent defense-evasion action that does not grant resource access.
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Principal can fully disable AWS Security Hub (securityhub:DisableSecurityHub), eliminating all detection from GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, Config, and IAM Access Analyzer integrations - the highest-impact defense-evasion primitive that does not grant resource access.
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servicecatalog:UpdateConstraint + iam:PassRole(servicecatalog.amazonaws.com) on a LaunchRole constraint: replace the launch role bound to a product with a more privileged role. The next ProvisionProduct executes as the new launch role. can-execute-as execute-as-via-config-identity-swap propagates with CanPassIdentity to derive CanExecuteAs.
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servicecatalog:CreateConstraint + iam:PassRole(servicecatalog.amazonaws.com): add a LaunchRole constraint to a product in a portfolio, binding a chosen privileged role. All subsequent ProvisionProduct calls then execute as that launch role. can-execute-as execute-as-via-config-identity-swap propagates with CanPassIdentity to derive CanExecuteAs.
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sns:SetTopicAttributes can modify topic configuration including KmsMasterKeyId (SSE), DeliveryPolicy, SignatureVersion, etc., enabling data-exposure and delivery attacks.
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states:UpdateStateMachine combined with iam:PassRole on a new role allows swapping the execution role to a different IAM identity on an existing state machine.
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states:SendTaskSuccess / states:SendTaskFailure with a valid taskToken allows steering an active execution through branching logic or injecting data into downstream Task states.
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states:UpdateStateMachineAlias / states:CreateStateMachineAlias allows redirecting an alias to a different definition version without triggering visible definition-update alerts.
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A principal with ec2:CreateTransitGatewayRoute or ec2:ReplaceTransitGatewayRoute on a TGW route table can inject or overwrite routes, redirecting inter-VPC or on-premises traffic to an attacker-controlled attachment - man-in-the-middle at L3 or traffic sinkhole. Modeled as CanModifyConfiguration on the Route (TGW route table) node.
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A principal with ec2:AssociateTransitGatewayRouteTable or ec2:EnableTransitGatewayRouteTablePropagation can silently re-route an attachment to a permissive route table or add a propagation that opens routing between otherwise-isolated VPCs - a quiet network-isolation bypass. Modeled as CanModifyConfiguration on the TransitGateway node.
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A principal with ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress or ec2:ModifySecurityGroupRules can add an allow-from-0.0.0.0/0 (or any source) inbound rule to a security group, potentially exposing protected resources to new network sources.
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A principal with ec2:CreateSecurityGroup can create a new permissive SG, then attach it to a resource (requires ec2:ModifyNetworkInterfaceAttribute or service-specific attach permission), effectively bypassing existing rules.
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A principal with ec2:CreateRoute, ec2:ReplaceRoute, or ec2:AttachInternetGateway can make a previously-private subnet internet-routable, exposing any resource in that subnet that has a public IP.
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A principal with ec2:CreateVpcPeeringConnection can initiate a VPC peering to any VPC (including cross-account). Accepting requires ec2:AcceptVpcPeeringConnection on the accepter side. This permission enables establishing new cross-VPC connectivity.
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A principal with ec2:CreateTransitGatewayVpcAttachment can initiate a VPC attachment request to a Transit Gateway, expanding the VPC's routing domain to the TGW network (if the attachment is accepted).
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A principal with ec2:AcceptTransitGatewayVpcAttachment can accept a pending attachment request, transitioning the VPC connection to active routing status.
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A principal with ec2:CreateNetworkAclEntry, ec2:ReplaceNetworkAclEntry, or ec2:ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation can modify Network ACL rules, changing the firewall posture at the subnet level. This is a weaken-controls primitive for stateless packet filtering, complementary to security groups.
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A principal with ec2:ModifyVpcEndpointServicePermissions can grant or revoke access to a PrivateLink producer endpoint, controlling which principals (including foreign accounts) can consume the service.
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A principal with vpc-lattice:CreateServiceNetworkServiceAssociation on a service network can associate an attacker-controlled service, exposing it to all connected-VPC clients for phishing/SSRF.
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vpc-lattice:UpdateRule or vpc-lattice:UpdateListener lets a principal redirect traffic to an attacker-controlled target group, intercepting L7 traffic from all service consumers.
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vpc-lattice:UpdateServiceNetwork or vpc-lattice:UpdateService with authType=NONE disables auth policy evaluation, making all services in the network (or the individual service) invocable by any connected-VPC client without IAM authentication.
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registries/write changes admin account state, trust policy, anonymous pull, network rules - alters the security posture of the entire registry.
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managedClusters/write can disable local account restrictions, change the OIDC issuer, swap kubelet MI, or alter network egress - configuration changes that unlock or change escalation paths.
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Modify the identity block of an Automation Account via automationAccounts/write; enables identity swap (CanAttachIdentity-like escalation).
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Write plaintext Automation Variables that runbooks read; enables behavior modification or credential injection into the execution sandbox.
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Modify or replace Automation Account connections, including legacy RunAs service principal credentials.
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A principal with IdentityProvider.ReadWrite.All or Global Admin can inject a malicious external IdP into a B2C user flow.
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B2C IEF Policy Administrator or Global Admin can upload/replace custom policy XML, effectively reconfiguring the entire authentication and federation pipeline.
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databaseAccounts/write allows modifying account properties (disableLocalAuth, firewall, CMK) - enabling configuration attacks such as re-enabling key auth or firewall bypass.
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Cluster create/edit permission allows modifying Spark configuration (MI binding, credential passthrough, init scripts).
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Cluster policy write/admin allows loosening security constraints on cluster creation (init scripts, credential passthrough, unconstrained Spark conf).
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Modify factory-level config (identity block, Git integration, public network access) via factories/write.
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Overwrite a linked service definition to inject attacker-controlled credentials or an attacker data source endpoint.
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Modify an ADF Integration Runtime configuration to swap SHIR VM assignment, reconfigure managed VNet, or change IR type - enables command execution or data exfiltration via network steering.
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Write access to record sets in a public Azure DNS zone (any record type via wildcard or specific-type write) lets an attacker create or overwrite A, CNAME, MX, or other records, redirecting hostnames under the zone to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
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Write access to NS records in a public DNS zone lets an attacker replace the name-server delegation for the zone (or a sub-zone), routing all subsequent DNS queries through attacker-controlled authoritative nameservers - a higher-blast-radius attack than single-record modification.
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Write access to record sets in a private Azure DNS zone (any record type) lets an attacker create or overwrite internal hostname records, redirecting resolution for internal service FQDNs (including private endpoint hostnames) to attacker-controlled private IPs within the VNet - enabling internal MitM or service impersonation.
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Write access to VNet links on a private DNS zone lets an attacker add new VNet links, extending the zone's resolution scope to additional VNets - including VNets in other subscriptions within the same tenant - expanding the blast radius of any private DNS record modification.
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Modify an existing event subscription's endpoint, redirecting all future events to an attacker-controlled webhook; enables event exfiltration and payload inspection.
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Create a new event subscription on a topic or system topic, binding an event source to an attacker-controlled webhook endpoint.
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Modifying Event Grid partner configurations authorizes an external partner to publish events into this subscription; a capability to alter subscription-level messaging trust.
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Modify the Capture configuration of an event hub (eventhubs/write) to redirect the Avro capture stream to an attacker-controlled storage account; all events are then captured to attacker storage.
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Write access to the Azure Firewall object (classic model) lets an attacker add or replace NAT, Network, or Application rule collections - inserting ALLOW rules or DNAT entries to open previously blocked network paths. When a Firewall Policy is attached, the classic inline rule collections become read-only (policy model takes precedence).
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Write access to Firewall Policy rule collection groups allows an attacker to add or replace NAT, Network, or Application rule collection groups - inserting ALLOW or DNAT entries to open previously blocked network paths.
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Write access to AFD security policies (Microsoft.Cdn/profiles/securityPolicies/write) lets an attacker detach or replace the WAF policy linked to an AFD endpoint, removing bot protection, rate limiting, and custom detection rules from the public entry point.
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Write access to AFD origin configuration (Microsoft.Cdn/profiles/originGroups/origins/write) lets an attacker replace an origin's hostname with an attacker-controlled server, causing AFD to forward real user requests (with authentication headers and session cookies) to attacker infrastructure.
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Write access to AFD rule sets and rules (Microsoft.Cdn/profiles/ruleSets/rules/write) lets an attacker inject response headers (including Set-Cookie), perform request redirects to attacker-controlled URLs, and modify URL rewrites - all without touching origins or WAF.
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Write access to the WAF policy object itself (Microsoft.Network/FrontDoorWebApplicationFirewallPolicies/write) lets an attacker modify or delete managed rule sets and custom rules, effectively neutering WAF protections without touching the AFD profile or securityPolicies link.
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Writing a Load Balancer resource allows adding a public frontend IP, new load-balancing rules, or inbound NAT rules that expose previously private ports.
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Writing a Load Balancer backend address pool allows adding an attacker-controlled VM to the pool, routing a fraction of traffic to it for interception or amplification.
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Creating or modifying an inbound NAT rule maps a public LB frontend port directly to a backend VM's port, potentially exposing SSH/RDP/admin ports to the internet.
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Writing an Application Gateway allows an attacker to redirect routing rules to attacker-controlled backends, swap SSL certificates, or modify the WAF policy binding - all without touching the backend VMs.
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Writing a WAF policy on an Application Gateway allows switching the policy from Prevention to Detection mode (allowing all attacks through) or disabling managed rule sets, weakening L7 security for all backends behind the gateway.
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Deleting a WAF policy detaches it from all associated Application Gateways, removing all L7 filtering and reverting those gateways to Standard_v2 (WAF-less) behavior.
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Modify Log Analytics workspace configuration (pricing tier, daily cap, retention) to halt or reduce log ingestion silently.
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Delete Sentinel analytics rules to silence specific threat detections (defense evasion - disable alerting for attack techniques).
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Disable or modify Sentinel analytics rules to suppress alerts for specific TTPs (defense evasion).
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Delete a Sentinel data connector to stop ingestion from a specific data source, creating a blind spot.
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Modify Sentinel automation rules to suppress automated incident response or redirect handling to an attacker-controlled playbook.
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Create or modify a workspace data export rule (configuration change). Redirecting logs to an attacker-controlled sink requires CanExfiltrate on the sink itself, which is emitted by a separate rule (azure-siem-data-export-active-to-sink) when export is enabled AND sink is writable. This rule emits CanModifyConfiguration on the workspace to model configuration capability; exfiltration is gated by sink ownership.
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Modify app settings/config of a Standard Logic App (WEBSITE_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE / image / env / identity).
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Write to a compute cluster - changes the compute identity block, SSH keys, subnet, or init scripts.
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Write access to a compute instance can modify SSH public key configuration and other network settings.
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Management-group write lets a principal reparent a subscription / child MG (move it into or out of an MG), altering which RBAC and guardrails it inherits.
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Write or replace a diagnostic setting, redirecting log export to an attacker-controlled destination or selectively excluding categories - a stealthier evasion than deletion because the setting remains present.
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Write or replace the subscription Activity Log profile, redirecting export to an attacker-controlled destination or narrowing the captured regions and categories.
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volumes/write permission on ANF volume enables export policy mutation.
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Principal with join/action on an NSG they control can re-associate (replace) the NSG on a target subnet or NIC, bypassing the original NSG's security rules. This is an NSG-specific escalation primitive that does not decompose into generic can-control or credential chains.
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Principal with securityRules/write can add an inbound Allow rule for Internet/0.0.0.0/0, opening previously blocked ports across all subnets and NICs where this NSG is associated.
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Principal with networkSecurityGroups/write can replace the full NSG rule set, including deleting all existing Deny rules - strictly stronger than securityRules/write alone.
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Write a policy assignment with deployIfNotExists or modify effect, specifying a managed identity (system- or user-assigned) that the remediation engine uses to deploy ARM templates or modify resources. This is modeled as CanModifyConfiguration on the remediation task (BuildWorker): writing the assignment modifies the identity binding and ARM template that the remediation task will execute. Downstream, can-execute-as execute-as-via-config-identity-swap combines this with CanPassIdentity(MI) to derive CanExecuteAs(MI).
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ARM write on the server resource sets/resets the native administrator password, enabling full DB access after network reach.
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Entra AD administrator assignment permission allows designating an Entra principal for DB admin access via token authentication when activeDirectoryAuth is enabled.
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Firewall write permission on a public-access server allows creating an allow-all rule, exposing the DB endpoint to the internet.
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Write access to a PaaS resource's privateEndpointConnections lets an attacker approve a PE connection from an attacker-controlled VNet, granting that VNet private network access to the resource - bypassing its public firewall.
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Write access to A or CNAME records in a private DNS zone (e.g., privatelink.vaultcore.azure.net) lets an attacker redirect in-VNet FQDN resolution for a PaaS service to an attacker-controlled IP - intercepting credentials or data sent to that service from any linked VNet.
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Write access to virtual network links in a private DNS zone lets an attacker link additional VNets to the zone, expanding the blast radius of a compromised or attacker-controlled DNS zone to additional VNets whose resources now resolve PaaS FQDNs via the attacker-influenced zone.
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Write access to a private endpoint's privateDnsZoneGroups lets an attacker re-link the PE to an attacker-controlled private DNS zone, redirecting DNS resolution of the PaaS service FQDN for that specific PE to an arbitrary IP.
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Write access to a Private Link Service (PLS) lets an attacker create or modify a PLS that fronts an attacker-controlled backend. This edge models the control-plane write capability (can create/modify a PLS), not the data-plane traffic interception (which is conditional on a consumer connecting to it).
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redis/write permission allows modifying cache configuration including authentication settings, port exposure, TLS version, and managed identity for CMK.
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Write access to Service Bus authorization rules allows creating a new Send-capable SAS rule, then calling listKeys to extract a connection string - a two-step credential escalation.
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Write access to the namespace network rule set allows disabling the default deny action or removing IP/VNet filters, opening the data-plane to previously blocked sources.
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A principal who can move a resource/RG/subscription out of a guardrail's scope escapes the deny assignment without editing it.
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workspaces/write allows changing the workspace identity block (attach/detach user-assigned MI), firewall rules, AAD admin, and integration runtime config - all alter execution identity or reach.
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integrationRuntimes/write allows creating or updating integration runtimes; self-hosted IR configuration can point to attacker-controlled infrastructure, causing all pipeline activities routed through that IR to execute on attacker infrastructure.
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Write access to NSG security rules lets an attacker add an inbound allow rule (e.g., source=Any, port=*, action=Allow) to open previously blocked network paths.
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Write access to the NSG object itself (create/replace) gives equivalent capability to rewrite all security rules, effectively bypassing any existing rule set.
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Write access to VNet peerings lets an attacker create or modify peerings, extending network reachability from an attacker-controlled VNet into this VNet.
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Write access to route table routes lets an attacker add a UDR redirecting traffic through an attacker-controlled next hop (NVA) - enabling traffic interception.
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Write access to public DNS zone record sets lets an attacker create or modify A/CNAME/alias records - enabling DNS hijack, redirect, or dangling-record takeover.
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Write access to private DNS zone record sets lets an attacker create or modify records - enabling DNS hijack or redirect within linked VNets.
azurederived
Write access to Microsoft.Network/privateEndpoints lets an attacker create a new private endpoint connecting a sensitive PaaS resource (Storage, Key Vault, SQL, etc.) to an in-VNet IP address - enabling a foothold in the VNet to reach that resource via PrivateReachability without internet traversal.
azurederived
Write access to hub VNet connections (hubVirtualNetworkConnections/write) lets an attacker attach a new spoke VNet to the hub, inserting an attacker-controlled VNet into the transit topology and gaining network-layer reach to all existing connected resources, or detach an existing spoke to disrupt connectivity.
azurederived
Write access to hub route tables (hubRouteTables/write) lets an attacker inject custom routes redirecting spoke traffic through an attacker-controlled next hop (NVA/VM), enabling network interception or MitM within the vWAN transit topology.
azurederived
Write access to hub routing intent policies (routingIntentPolicies/write) lets an attacker modify inter-hub and internet traffic routing, redirecting traffic flows through attacker-controlled firewalls or NVAs or disabling firewall inspection entirely.
azurederived
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artifactregistry.repositories.update can disable tag immutability, change remote/virtual repo upstreams, or otherwise reconfigure a repository - enabling subsequent supply-chain attacks that were previously BLOCKED.
gcpderived
caPools.update rewrites the issuance policy / identity constraints, enabling arbitrary-subject forgery.
gcpderived
compute.securityPolicies.update lets a principal modify rules in a Cloud Armor security policy - deleting DENY rules, removing geo/IP blocks, disabling adaptive protection, or inserting a catch-all ALLOW - weakening the WAF/DDoS edge access control protecting the attached HTTP(S) LB backend.
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Delete or modify a Cloud Asset Inventory asset feed, disrupting continuous inventory delivery to the reference collector's Pub/Sub topic - a cover-tracks evasion primitive that creates a detection blind spot.
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cloudbuild.workerpools.update lets the principal change a private worker pool's VPC peering configuration, redirecting future builds' network access.
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A principal holding dns.changes.create (or an equivalent role such as roles/dns.admin, roles/editor, or roles/owner) at the GCP project scope can submit DNS changesets to any public managed zone in that project, overwriting any resource record set - enabling hostname redirect, DNS-01 TLS certificate acquisition, MX record manipulation, and OAuth redirect URI abuse.
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A principal holding dns.managedZones.update at the GCP project scope can modify the privateVisibilityConfig.networks list for a private managed zone, expanding which VPC networks can resolve the zone. This enables widening the blast radius of a private-zone DNS poisoning attack by adding attacker-controlled VPC networks to the zone's visibility scope (cross-project lateral movement via shared VPC).
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