azure-postgres-mysql-entra-admin-readdata
Entra admin assignment (CanModifyConfiguration) plus network reachability to the DB endpoint yields full data-plane read of all databases via Entra token authentication.
match
A conjunctive graph pattern. Variables (?x) bind node ids; every clause must hold.
where
node_class(?server) == Data and node_type(?server) ==
RelationalDatabase
node_type(?server) matched provider_type in ['Microsoft.DBforPostgreSQL/flexibleServers', 'Microsoft.DBforMySQL/flexibleServers']
?server.properties.authConfig.activeDirectoryAuth == 'Enabled'
edge produced by azure-postgres-mysql-entra-admin-set (CanModifyConfiguration from administrators/write on this server)
emit
| source type | Identity |
|---|---|
| target type | RelationalDatabase |
| source | ?principal |
| target | ?server |
| permissions | Microsoft.DBforPostgreSQL/flexibleServers/administrators/write Microsoft.DBforMySQL/flexibleServers/administrators/write |
| conditions | network_reachability service_state |
| state logic | if ?server.properties.publicNetworkAccess == 'Disabled' (private-access topology / VNet injection): CONDITIONAL(network_reachability) — no public endpoint exists; attacker must have a foothold in the delegated subnet or a peered VNet to reach port 5432/3306; elif ?server.properties.publicNetworkAccess == 'Enabled' AND a firewall rule admitting the attacker's source IP exists (or rule 0.0.0.0–255.255.255.255): ACTIVE; elif ?server.properties.publicNetworkAccess == 'Enabled' AND no firewall rule covers the attacker's source: CONDITIONAL(network_reachability); if authConfig.activeDirectoryAuth != 'Enabled': DO NOT EMIT (the Entra admin identity cannot authenticate); if a deny assignment or deny Azure Policy covers administrators/write at effective scope (blocking the upstream CanModifyConfiguration): BLOCKED. |
Narrative
{principal.name} can set an Entra AD administrator on {server.name} (via flexibleServers/administrators/write), and Entra authentication is enabled on the server (authConfig.activeDirectoryAuth == 'Enabled'). Combined with network reachability to the database endpoint, the attacker (or the designated Entra principal) can authenticate using an Entra access token and gain database-level admin privileges, reading all databases and tables.
Raw rule rules/derived/azure/postgres-mysql.yaml
id: azure-postgres-mysql-entra-admin-readdata
emits: CanReadData
description: Entra admin assignment (CanModifyConfiguration) plus network reachability to the DB endpoint
yields full data-plane read of all databases via Entra token authentication.
match:
- - principal: null
- CanModifyConfiguration
- server: null
where:
- node_class(?server) == Data and node_type(?server) == RelationalDatabase
- node_type(?server) matched provider_type in ['Microsoft.DBforPostgreSQL/flexibleServers', 'Microsoft.DBforMySQL/flexibleServers']
- ?server.properties.authConfig.activeDirectoryAuth == 'Enabled'
- edge produced by azure-postgres-mysql-entra-admin-set (CanModifyConfiguration from administrators/write
on this server)
emit:
source_type: Identity
target_type: RelationalDatabase
source: ?principal
target: ?server
permissions:
- Microsoft.DBforPostgreSQL/flexibleServers/administrators/write
- Microsoft.DBforMySQL/flexibleServers/administrators/write
conditions:
- network_reachability
- service_state
state_logic: "if ?server.properties.publicNetworkAccess == 'Disabled' (private-access topology / VNet\
\ injection): CONDITIONAL(network_reachability) \u2014 no public endpoint exists; attacker must have\
\ a foothold in the delegated subnet or a peered VNet to reach port 5432/3306; elif ?server.properties.publicNetworkAccess\
\ == 'Enabled' AND a firewall rule admitting the attacker's source IP exists (or rule 0.0.0.0\u2013\
255.255.255.255): ACTIVE; elif ?server.properties.publicNetworkAccess == 'Enabled' AND no firewall\
\ rule covers the attacker's source: CONDITIONAL(network_reachability); if authConfig.activeDirectoryAuth\
\ != 'Enabled': DO NOT EMIT (the Entra admin identity cannot authenticate); if a deny assignment or\
\ deny Azure Policy covers administrators/write at effective scope (blocking the upstream CanModifyConfiguration):\
\ BLOCKED."
confidence: '0.88'
derived_from:
- 'CanModifyConfiguration edge: source=?principal, target=?server, rule=azure-postgres-mysql-entra-admin-set'
false_positive_note: "CRITICAL: Entra AD authentication MUST be enabled on the server (authConfig.activeDirectoryAuth\
\ == 'Enabled'). If it is disabled, the Entra admin is set at the control plane but cannot authenticate\
\ at the data plane \u2014 emit BLOCKED or DO NOT EMIT. Network reachability is a HARD gate. A private-access\
\ server (VNet-injected, publicNetworkAccess == Disabled) has no public endpoint \u2014 do NOT emit\
\ ACTIVE unless the principal is provably inside the VNet or peered network. For public-access servers:\
\ only ACTIVE when a firewall rule admits the attacker's source IP; the rule range 0.0.0.0\u2013255.255.255.255\
\ means any internet host, which yields ACTIVE."
narrative: '{principal.name} can set an Entra AD administrator on {server.name} (via flexibleServers/administrators/write),
and Entra authentication is enabled on the server (authConfig.activeDirectoryAuth == ''Enabled'').
Combined with network reachability to the database endpoint, the attacker (or the designated Entra
principal) can authenticate using an Entra access token and gain database-level admin privileges,
reading all databases and tables.'