gcp-psc-create-service-attachment
An identity with compute.serviceAttachments.create can publish a new Internal Load Balancer backend as a Private Service Connect service attachment, making it reachable by any PSC consumer that has the Service Attachment URI and can create a forwarding rule. This is a high-value capability for lateral movement or service hijacking attacks: the attacker can intercept traffic intended for a legitimate service or exfiltrate data through a honeypot endpoint. The published service is visible to all projects in ACCEPT_AUTOMATIC mode (default) or to explicitly listed projects in ACCEPT_MANUAL mode.
match (effective permission)
emit
| source type | Identity |
|---|---|
| target type | PrivateEndpoint |
| source | <principal> |
| target | <producer VPC/project> |
| permissions | compute.serviceAttachments.create |
| conditions | iam_permission |
| state logic | ACTIVE if principal holds compute.serviceAttachments.create at the effective scope. The newly published service is immediately reachable by any consumer with the Service Attachment URI (if ACCEPT_AUTOMATIC) or by explicitly approved consumer projects (if ACCEPT_MANUAL with acceptlist). |
Narrative
{principal.name} can create a new PSC Service Attachment in the {producer_project} (compute.serviceAttachments.create), publishing an Internal Load Balancer backend as a private service reachable by authorized consumer projects, enabling lateral movement or service hijacking attacks.
Raw rule rules/derived/gcp/psc.yaml
id: gcp-psc-create-service-attachment
emits: CanModifyConfiguration
description: 'An identity with compute.serviceAttachments.create can publish a new Internal Load Balancer
backend as a Private Service Connect service attachment, making it reachable by any PSC consumer that
has the Service Attachment URI and can create a forwarding rule. This is a high-value capability for
lateral movement or service hijacking attacks: the attacker can intercept traffic intended for a legitimate
service or exfiltrate data through a honeypot endpoint. The published service is visible to all projects
in ACCEPT_AUTOMATIC mode (default) or to explicitly listed projects in ACCEPT_MANUAL mode.'
match_effective_permission:
action: compute.serviceAttachments.create
resource_type: compute.googleapis.com/ServiceAttachment
emit:
source_type: Identity
target_type: PrivateEndpoint
source: <principal>
target: <producer VPC/project>
permissions:
- compute.serviceAttachments.create
conditions:
- iam_permission
state_logic: ACTIVE if principal holds compute.serviceAttachments.create at the effective scope. The
newly published service is immediately reachable by any consumer with the Service Attachment URI (if
ACCEPT_AUTOMATIC) or by explicitly approved consumer projects (if ACCEPT_MANUAL with acceptlist).
derived_from:
- '<effective permission: compute.serviceAttachments.create on producer project>'
false_positive_note: "compute.serviceAttachments.create is included in roles/compute.networkAdmin and\
\ roles/compute.admin; check effective permission. Creating a Service Attachment alone does not grant\
\ data access to the Internal LB backend \u2014 the backend's own IAM and application-layer auth still\
\ apply. However, publishing a new service is a meaningful stepping stone for network-layer interception\
\ or persistence."
narrative: '{principal.name} can create a new PSC Service Attachment in the {producer_project} (compute.serviceAttachments.create),
publishing an Internal Load Balancer backend as a private service reachable by authorized consumer
projects, enabling lateral movement or service hijacking attacks.'