CanDelete

Delete an Access Analyzer, removing all findings and disabling ongoing IAM access analysis for the zone of trust - a hard delete of a detective control that reduces detection fidelity without granting access (non-walkable edge).

Principal with cloudtrail:DeleteTrail can permanently destroy a trail, creating an irreversible audit blind spot. Existing S3 log objects are unaffected; only future event capture is eliminated.

Principal with cloudtrail:DeleteEventDataStore can permanently destroy a CloudTrail Lake event data store, eliminating the long-term audit retention store for the organization. This is a high-impact anti-forensic primitive.

cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms permanently removes one or more CloudWatch alarms, eliminating the detective control entirely - a higher-impact, more-detectable evasion than DisableAlarmActions.

logs:DeleteLogGroup permanently deletes a log group and all its stored events - evidence destruction that eliminates forensic audit records.

IAM principal with directconnect:DeleteVirtualInterface can disrupt existing Direct Connect routing (availability impact, not escalation).

A principal with fms:DeletePolicy can permanently delete an existing Firewall Manager policy, eliminating org-wide enforcement of WAF/Shield/Security Group/ Network Firewall/DNS Firewall controls across all in-scope member accounts. This is an irreversible destructive action with maximum blast radius.

A principal with fms:DeleteNotificationChannel can permanently remove the SNS topic that receives FMS compliance notifications, creating an irreversible silent-running state for FMS enforcement.

Delete the GuardDuty detector, permanently eliminating threat detection in the account/region.

Disabling Macie (macie2:DisableMacie) permanently disables the service, deletes all configurations and findings, and removes sensitive-data classification from the account - a weaken-defenses / cover-tracks / destructive primitive.

Permanently delete a customer-managed Rule Group, breaking all Web ACLs that reference it (requires prior removal of all associations).

Permanently delete a Web ACL, removing WAF protection from all previously associated resources (requires prior disassociation).

Delete a Log Analytics workspace, destroying all ingested log evidence (defense evasion - cover tracks). Soft-delete for 14 days unless purge is forced. This is resource destruction (CanDelete), not data-row deletion (CanDeleteData). CanDeleteData target set [Storage, Data] excludes LoggingService (ManagementService), so CanDelete (target=*) is semantically correct for resource-level destruction.

Purge specific log data from a Log Analytics workspace (irreversible - targeted evidence destruction). The purge/action operation is data-plane irreversible row deletion within an existing workspace (distinct from workspaces/delete which destroys the workspace resource). CanDeleteData target set [Storage, Data] excludes LoggingService (ManagementService), so CanDelete (target=*) is the correct fallback to model data-plane row deletion capability.

Delete a diagnostic setting on an Azure resource or at subscription scope, stopping export of that resource's (or subscription's) Activity Log and resource logs to a Log Analytics workspace, storage account, or Event Hub. Headline defense-evasion primitive: subsequent attacker API activity goes unrecorded in the monitored scope.

Delete the subscription-level Activity Log export profile (legacy Microsoft.Insights/logProfiles), stopping archive of all ARM management-plane events for the entire subscription.

Delete a scheduled query (log search) alert rule, silencing automated detection based on KQL log queries - disables alerting on specific threat patterns or compliance baselines.

Delete a metric alert rule, silencing automated detection triggered by metric thresholds (CPU, memory, network, custom metrics). Metric alerts fire independently of log-search alerts and are on distinct ARM resource types.

Delete an activity log alert rule, silencing automated detection triggered by Azure Resource Manager (ARM) control-plane events (resource creation, deletion, policy changes, role assignments). Activity log alerts are distinct from scheduled-query and metric alerts, on their own ARM resource type.

Delete an action group, silencing the response actions (email, SMS, webhook, Azure Function, Logic App, Automation Runbook) for ALL alert rules that reference it - a high-blast-radius evasion against automated incident response.

Delete a policy assignment, removing the guardrail at that scope. For Deny-effect assignments this unblocks all previously-denied ARM operations at the scope. Destructive impact (cover-tracks); not modeled as escalation.

Delete a custom or _Default log bucket (logging.buckets.delete), permanently destroying all retained log history stored in it.

An identity with compute.forwardingRules.delete on a PSC consumer endpoint (forwarding rule with purpose=PRIVATE_SERVICE_CONNECT) can remove it. This is a destructive capability that disrupts private connectivity to the producer service, purely an availability impact rather than privilege escalation or data access.