Edge types
All 80 edge types.
Physical/logical attachment. Semantic edges (ExecutesAs, HasPolicy) carry the security meaning.
structural
Credential/identity authenticates to a service/endpoint (incl. SaaS/DB).
cross_boundary
walkable
Source can add a principal (itself) to a group/role and inherit its permissions.
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Full control (admin/owner) over a resource - implies most other capabilities on it.
resource_control
walkable
high value
Source can obtain the target identity's credentials/session (role assumption).
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Source can attach/replace the identity a compute resource runs as, including updating a workflow/orchestration service's execution identity. Also applies to data resources (caches, databases) where an identity is used for encryption or service-to-service auth. Produced both by explicit normalization (attach/assign permissions on target resources) and by derived rules (e.g., CanPassIdentity + CanModifyConfiguration on target).
execution
walkable
Derived summary: source effectively controls target (admin OR sufficient sub-capabilities).
resource_control
walkable
high value
Source can create new resources of a type within a scope.
resource_control
walkable
Source can mint a NEW long-lived/short-lived credential for the target and thus authenticate as it.
credential
walkable
high value
Source can create keys (SA key creation overlaps CanCreateCredentialFor).
credential
walkable
Source can create a new compute resource bound to target identity (create + pass identity).
execution
walkable
high value
Source can use a key to decrypt data/secrets (gates CanReadData on encrypted stores).
credential
walkable
high value
Domain-wide/OAuth delegation to act for other principals.
identity_authz
walkable
Destructive; persistence/impact not escalation. Excluded from default paths. Produced by explicit normalization (delete-permission IAM actions) and by derived rules (evasion/cover-tracks primitives like disabling detective services).
resource_control
Destructive impact; not escalation.
data
Source can deploy new workloads to a platform (then attach identity).
execution
walkable
Source can obtain a principal/session inside the target AWS account.
cross_boundary
walkable
high value
Source reaches org-level control (management account, org policy admin).
cross_boundary
walkable
high value
Source can gain access within the target GCP project.
cross_boundary
walkable
high value
Source can gain control-plane access within the target subscription.
cross_boundary
walkable
high value
Source can obtain a principal in the target Entra tenant (guest, multi-tenant app, B2B).
cross_boundary
walkable
high value
Derived: source can become an identity with strictly greater privilege (rolls up an escalation chain).
derived
walkable
high value
Attacker-controlled code can run with the target identity's privileges. Canonical derived escalation edge.
execution
walkable
high value
Source can run OS-level commands on a host/container/managed runtime (agent, run-command, exec, session-pool exec). Notebook targets cover managed notebook instances (Vertex AI Workbench, SageMaker) whose kernels execute arbitrary code as the instance's runtime identity.
execution
walkable
high value
Generalized 'can get code running on this resource' (superset of command/deploy/modify).
execution
walkable
Can move data out of boundary (share snapshot cross-account, presign URL, replicate).
data
walkable
Source can export raw key material (rare; high impact - persistent offline decrypt/sign).
credential
walkable
External/workload identity is trusted to federate into a CSP identity (OIDC/SAML/Workload Identity).
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Source can assign a role/permission to a principal (incl. itself) - privilege escalation primitive.
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Source acts as target without holding long-lived creds (GCP SA impersonation, act-on-behalf-of).
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Source can directly invoke the target (completes an ExecutesAs escalation when code already attacker-controlled or config changed). Messaging sources include service-to-service invocations (API Gateway invoking Lambda, EventBridge invoking Lambda, etc.).
execution
walkable
General modify capability (specialized by CanModifyCode/Configuration/Policy where meaningful). Produced by explicit normalization (modify permissions) and derived rules (config-modification attack paths like CloudTrail tampering, logging-service disablement).
resource_control
walkable
Source can change the executable content a compute resource runs, including orchestration workflows and logic apps that are executable definitions. Produced by explicit normalization (code-update permissions) and by derived rules (supply-chain code-injection paths).
execution
walkable
high value
Source can change config (env vars, layers, startup command, identity binding) to gain execution or escalate. Produced by explicit normalization (control-plane config-update permissions) and by derived rules (trigger hijacking, notification redirection).
execution
walkable
high value
Source can alter an identity/resource policy to grant itself/others more access. Produced both by explicit normalization (IAM/RBAC setPolicy grants) and by derived rules (deny-policy/org-policy modify capabilities that unlock gated edges).
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Source can rewrite who may assume/impersonate the target - self-grant assumption.
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Source can reach target over the network (post SG/firewall/route evaluation). Messaging source/target covers publicly- or privately-reachable messaging endpoints (a queue/topic/event-bus with a public resource policy is an internet-reachable target; a private messaging endpoint is a private-link source/target) - consistent with ExposedToInternet and PrivateReachability, which already admit the Messaging class.
network
walkable
Source may attach/pass the target identity to a NEW or existing workload (prereq for CanExecuteAs).
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Reachability to a specific service port (gates exploitation of a listening service).
network
walkable
Read configuration/metadata of a resource (recon; low base value). Produced by explicit normalization (configuration-read IAM permissions) and by derived rules (recon primitives like reading Macie findings to identify sensitive-data targets).
resource_control
walkable
Source can obtain a usable credential (instance metadata token, env var, key file).
credential
walkable
Effective data-plane read (control-plane perm + network reach + decrypt if encrypted). Includes reading messages from a queue/topic/stream.
data
walkable
high value
Source can read secret material (often yields creds for another identity/service).
credential
walkable
high value
Membership removal - mostly destructive/persistence, not escalation; not walked by default.
identity_authz
Delete+recreate to inherit name/identity/trust (config-drift escalation).
resource_control
walkable
Source can reset/replace target's password/MFA and take over.
credential
walkable
Source can obtain an access/OIDC token for an identity (metadata endpoint, token mint).
credential
walkable
Source can create a schedule/trigger to drive execution (persistence + trigger creation).
execution
walkable
Source can sign tokens/blobs as the target (JWT/SAML signing -> forge identity).
credential
walkable
high value
Source can start a stopped resource (needed to realize CONDITIONAL execution edges).
execution
walkable
Source can become owner (Azure SP/app owner, resource owner) and thereby self-grant control.
resource_control
walkable
Source can cause the target to execute (event source, schedule). Includes triggering compute workloads and orchestration workflows. AnalyticsService sources cover analytics engines that invoke compute as part of query execution (e.g. an Athena federated query invoking its Lambda data-source connector).
execution
walkable
Modify a resource's configuration. Produced by explicit normalization (write permissions) and derived rules (config-write attack paths).
resource_control
walkable
Effective data-plane write (can poison code/artifacts/config → onward execution). Includes publishing/sending to a queue/topic/event bus.
data
walkable
Container holds child resources/objects: administrative boundaries, storage containers, data stores (SQL servers and their databases/firewall rules), secret vaults (Key Vault and its secrets/keys), management services and their artifacts.
structural
Resource stores a usable credential. Includes hardcoded credentials in workflow definitions, SAS keys in message connectors, and API keys in event subscriptions.
data
walkable
Recon: resource references another (connection targets, IaC). Aids collection, not traversal. Network sources (e.g., Route 53 DNS zones) reference alias targets like ELB/CloudFront/S3; dangling aliases are a legitimate structural relationship.
data
Resource stores secret material (drives ExposesCredential).
data
walkable
Terminal control edge: source can administer the target boundary/resource (objective attainment).
derived
walkable
high value
A credential harvested in one environment authenticates to another (cross-cloud/SaaS).
cross_boundary
walkable
This secret/credential authenticates as the target. Zero-cost link completing credential chains.
credential
walkable
high value
A trust/resource policy names a principal in another account (feeds CanAssume/CanEnterAccount). Produced by explicit normalization (policy artifact parsing) and by derived rules (cross-account data-resource sharing patterns like S3 bucket policy with foreign principal). Subscription targets cover Azure's account-boundary analog - a cross-subscription trust (e.g. an approved cross-subscription Private Endpoint connection, or cross-subscription VNet peering).
cross_boundary
walkable
Cross-project IAM binding / SA usage. ServiceAccount targets cover a workload in one project running as (trusting) a service account owned by another project (e.g. a Vertex AI job or Workbench instance with a cross-project runtime SA) - symmetric with ServiceAccount as a source.
cross_boundary
walkable
B2B/guest/multi-tenant app trust across Entra tenants.
cross_boundary
walkable
A workload (Compute or Messaging) runs under the target identity. Zero-cost link (a fact, not an action) enabling CanExecuteAs derivations. Includes orchestration workflows, logic apps, and event consumers running as a specified identity.
execution
walkable
high value
Reachable/usable account/subscription/project-wide.
network
walkable
Target is reachable/abusable from the public internet - common attack entry point (incl. a queue/topic/API with a public/wildcard resource policy).
network
walkable
high value
Reachable/usable by any principal in the tenant/org (broad blast radius).
network
walkable
Resource contains/leaks a credential usable for the target identity (env var, code, connstring, metadata, API key). Target can be a Credential, Identity, or Secret/APIKey node.
credential
walkable
An external/workload identity resolves to a concrete internal principal (guest->member, IdP subject->role, k8s SA->IAM role).
cross_boundary
walkable
Identity in provider A is trusted to obtain an identity in provider B (OIDC/SAML/WIF). Enables cross-cloud paths.
cross_boundary
walkable
high value
EFFECTIVE permission (post evaluation) of an action on a target. Produced by the permission engine / effective-permission evaluator.
identity_authz
walkable
A policy artifact is attached to a principal/resource. Feeds the permission evaluator; not walked directly.
identity_authz
Principal is directly granted a role (Entra role, GCP role binding, IAM role attachment).
identity_authz
walkable
Placement metadata (region/subnet). Useful for filtering, not traversal.
structural
Source inherits the target's permissions via membership.
identity_authz
walkable
high value
Network peering - expands reachability across VPCs/VNets/accounts.
network
Reachable only via private networking (PrivateLink/PE/PSC) - needs a foothold in-network. Includes private APIs and messaging endpoints accessible only via interface endpoints, and object storage reached via a private/gateway endpoint (Azure Blob/Files PE, GCS via PSC). Network sources cover the endpoint/distribution itself acting as the reachability actor (e.g. a CloudFront distribution's OAC/OAI reaching a private S3 origin, or a Private Endpoint node).
network
walkable
Routing fact feeding CanNetworkReach derivation.
network
Target trusts an external/federated/workload principal - inbound cross-boundary access (incl. k8s IRSA/WI federation). Source can be an identity (principal), a resource policy, or a policy document (e.g., B2C trust policy) that declares the trust.
cross_boundary
walkable