CanRetrieveToken

Code executing on the service can fetch the instance role's session token.

Instances launched by the ASG expose the instance-profile role's credentials via IMDS.

A privileged Batch container on an EC2 compute environment can read the instance role from IMDS.

Code on a Beanstalk instance (or SSRF against the app) reads the instance profile creds from IMDS.

CodeArtifact GetAuthorizationToken returns a short-lived bearer credential (up to 12 hours) for authenticated repository access - a credential-access primitive often exfiltrated from CI/CD environments.

Code running on an instance can read the instance-profile role token from IMDS.

Code in an ECS task reads the task role's temp credentials from the metadata endpoint.

Code running as the function can fetch the execution-role token.

A Lightsail instance with an associated IAM role exposes that role's session via IMDS.

Any code in a container group can mint a bearer token for each bound managed identity (Linux IMDS, Windows IDENTITY_ENDPOINT).

Any code in the app worker can mint a bearer token for each bound MI via the App Service MSI token endpoint.

Code executing in an Automation Account sandbox can retrieve a bearer token for the bound MI from IMDS.

Any code on a Batch node can mint a bearer token for each pool user-assigned MI via IMDS.

Attacker-controlled code in a container can mint a bearer token for each reachable bound managed identity via the local identity endpoint.

Any code on a cluster with a bound MI can mint a bearer token for that MI via IMDS.

Custom activities in ADF pipelines (running on Batch pools) can request a bearer token for the factory MI via the Azure IMDS endpoint.

A WIF service connection lets a pipeline job request a short-lived Azure DevOps OIDC token that is then exchanged for an ARM access token; any code in the job can call the OIDC endpoint.

Any code in a Function app can mint a bearer token for each bound MI via the App Service identity endpoint.

Code/actions in a Standard Logic App can mint a bearer token for each bound MI via the App Service identity endpoint.

Any code on an AML compute node can mint a bearer token for the compute MI via IMDS.

Any code running on a host that has a managed identity bound can obtain a bearer token for that MI from the IMDS (or App Service identity) endpoint with no Entra credential.

An attacker who can start a stopped host can then retrieve IMDS tokens for its bound MI.

Code in a managed-identity-enabled SF service can mint a bearer token for the app's MI from the per-node localhost token service.

Any code running on Synapse Spark/pipeline compute can mint a bearer token for the workspace MI via IMDS.

Any code on a VM can mint a bearer token for each bound managed identity via IMDS.

Any code-exec primitive on a fleet that has an MI yields that MI's token from IMDS.

Code running in an App Engine instance can read the runtime SA token from the GCE metadata server.

Attacker with execution in the job can mint the runtime SA token.

Code running in a Cloud Run container mints tokens for the runtime SA from the metadata server.

Retargeting an existing HTTP job's URI (via jobs.update) to an attacker-controlled endpoint causes the existing SA's OIDC/OAuth2 bearer token to be delivered on the next invocation - no actAs on the SA required since the SA is unchanged.

Any principal with code exec on the instance can read the metadata token.

Attacker with execution in the function can mint the runtime SA token.

Executing inside a pod on a legacy-metadata node pool (no GKE_METADATA) allows the code to call the GCE metadata server and retrieve the node pool SA's access token.