Backup

backup:StartCopyJob copies individual recovery points from a backup vault to a vault in a different AWS account, enabling complete data exfiltration by restoring the copied backups in the attacker's account.

backup:StartRestoreJob provisions a new resource from a backup recovery point; the restored resource can be accessed if the principal also has target-service read permissions (RDS login, EC2 key pair, EFS mount, etc.).

backup:PutBackupVaultLockConfiguration allows locking a backup vault in compliance mode, preventing deletion of recovery points and vault access policy changes for a configured retention period - a persistence/ransomware primitive.

backup:PutBackupVaultAccessPolicy allows rewriting a backup vault's access policy, enabling an attacker to grant itself or an external account data-access permissions (StartRestoreJob, StartCopyJob).

dynamodb:RestoreTableFromBackup restores a table from an on-demand backup; reading it requires separate GetItem/Scan/Query permission on the restored table ARN (CONDITIONAL path).

An identity with fsx:CopyBackup on a source backup ARN in a foreign account can pull a complete copy into an attacker-controlled account; restoring via CreateFileSystemFromBackup gives full read of all data at backup time.

A backup's resource policy (via fsx:GetResourcePolicy) grants fsx:CopyBackup to a principal in a different AWS account, establishing a cross-account trust on the backup resource.

An identity with fsx:CreateVolumeFromBackup on an ONTAP volume backup (same account) can restore the volume to an ONTAP file system they control, achieving lateral movement and data access to the restored volume.

An identity with fsx:PutResourcePolicy on an FSx backup can rewrite the backup's resource policy to grant an external account fsx:CopyBackup access, staging a cross-account backup exfil without touching the live file system.

An identity with fsx:CreateFileSystemFromBackup on a same-account backup can restore the data to a new file system in a different VPC or AD domain, achieving lateral movement and data access within the same account.

A principal with bigtable.backups.read on a source backup AND bigtable.backups.create + bigtable.backups.restore in a destination instance (any project) can copy the backup cross-project and restore the full table contents in the destination, exfiltrating all data outside the source project boundary.

A principal holding file.backups.get in the source project plus file.instances.create or file.instances.update in an attacker-controlled destination project can restore a Filestore backup to the destination, exfiltrating all data. This is a multi-project, multi-permission escalation path documented as one of the three central attack primitives for Filestore.

datastore.backups.restoreDatabase on a Firestore database + access to a Firestore backup enables restoring the backup, completely overwriting all current database content. Identical attack impact to import but via backup rather than GCS export.