ConfigurationService
Config/Policy/asset inventory.
class: ManagementService
Realizing resources
aws aws
| resource | scope | enumerate | required permissions |
|---|---|---|---|
aws:config:config-rule |
regional | config:DescribeConfigRules |
config:DescribeConfigRules |
As edge source
As edge target
Exposure sites
None.
Rules that touch ConfigurationService 11
config:ListAggregateDiscoveredResources or config:BatchGetAggregateResourceConfig on a Config Aggregator exposes cross-account resource inventory and configurations - recon primitive.
aws
CanReadWrite auto-provisioning settings (Microsoft.Security/autoProvisioningSettings/write); disabling auto-provisioning prevents automatic deployment of the Log Analytics agent and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on newly created or reimaged VMs and Arc-connected machines, leaving them unmonitored by Defender for Cloud.
azure
CanModifyWrite workspace settings (Microsoft.Security/workspaceSettings/write); redirecting the Defender data pipeline to a different or non-existent workspace severs log collection and alert generation subscription-wide.
azure
CanModifyDelete a policy assignment, removing the guardrail at that scope. For Deny-effect assignments this unblocks all previously-denied ARM operations at the scope. Destructive impact (cover-tracks); not modeled as escalation.
azure
CanDeleteModify an existing policy assignment's parameters, scope, or enforcement mode to weaken or disable its guardrail effect (e.g., set enforcementMode=DoNotEnforce to turn a Deny assignment into an audit-only posture, or narrow the scope). Applies to any effect type. This is governance evasion - separate from the execution-path rule (rule 1) which targets deployIfNotExists/modify assignments with a bound MI.
azure
CanModifyPolicyOverwrite a custom policy definition to change its effect from Deny (or Audit) to Disabled or Audit, neutralizing a guardrail that applies wherever that definition is assigned - potentially subscription-wide or org-wide. This is a stealthy defense-evasion primitive that modifies the definition rather than creating a visible exemption.
azure
CanModifyPolicyWrite a policy exemption to remove a resource or scope from Azure Policy enforcement (governance evasion). For Deny-effect assignments this may unblock previously-denied ARM operations. This is a control-bypass / cover-tracks primitive - it does NOT directly grant access to the exempted resource.
azure
CanModifyPolicyOverwrite a custom policy set definition (initiative) to change the effect of bundled policy rules from Deny (or Audit) to Disabled or Audit, neutralizing a guardrail that applies wherever that initiative is assigned - potentially subscription-wide or org-wide. An initiative can bundle multiple deployIfNotExists or Deny rules; overwriting one has the same org-wide blast radius as modifying a single policyDefinition. This is a stealthy defense-evasion primitive.
azure
CanModifyPolicyA principal holding Purview Data Reader (or higher-privilege roles: Data Curator, Data Source Administrator, Collection Admin) with network reachability to the Purview account can enumerate all catalog assets, classifications, scan results, and data lineage via the Purview REST API, enabling reconnaissance of sensitive data sources and classifications across the organization.
azure
CanReadSearch, list, or export all GCP assets and IAM policy bindings at org/folder/project scope via Cloud Asset Inventory - the same enumeration the reference collector performs, giving an attacker a pre-built map of the environment.
gcp
CanReadDelete or modify a Cloud Asset Inventory asset feed, disrupting continuous inventory delivery to the reference collector's Pub/Sub topic - a cover-tracks evasion primitive that creates a detection blind spot.